Assessing “Shaping” Capabilities With Exploitation ⇔ Materialization Theory

Robert Sh, Jul 6. 2025. Recommended reading related to this post: Hacker and the State

Introduction

Efficiency in cyber operations is too often celebrated purely as a matter of how many systems an actor can break into, how quickly, and at what scale. That view fixes our gaze on the technical contest: operational capacity, zero-days, scale—while obscuring the strategic endgame. A more complete understanding must weigh not only the ability to exploit but also the capacity to materialize. Put differently, an operation is efficient only if it translates gains in cyberspace into concrete gains in the physical world.

I propose a dual-axis model of cyber efficiency, arguing that the conversion ratio—the speed and certainty with which exploitation becomes effect—shapes actor behavior ranging from target selection to risk thresholds. Appreciating this dynamic allows operators to better understand adversary behavior in cyberspace.

1. Two Axes of Cyber Efficiency

Imagine plotting an operation on a plane. The horizontal axis measures exploitation capacity: scope, scale, and speed of initial compromise. The vertical axis measures materialization capacity: the actor’s proficiency at converting that compromise into objectives in the real world. Occupying the upper‑right quadrant—high exploitation and high materialization is strategic gold as it relates to shaping outcomes in the real world. However, it also signals a formidable threat to everyone else. Dominance on only one axis, by contrast, signals weak shaping capabilities. You’re left with either ample cyber capabilities with no leverage, or momentary effects that cannot be sustained.

Exploitation Capacity (Scope–Scale–Speed-Persistence)

Sophisticated threat actors compress the kill chain, are able to exploit broadly over time, iterating new operations at scale. These actors are able to use these capabilities, persistently over time.

Materialization Capacity (Timeliness–Fidelity–Cost–Persistence)

Here we ask: How quickly can the actor trigger the intended effects from exploitation gains? How precisely can it shape outcomes? How long will the advantage last? Operations that race across networks yet never produce leverage score high on exploitation and low on materialization. Such operations may be spectacular but are strategically hollow.

2. The Conversion Ratio and Target Choice

States invest strategically, seeking the highest return per operation. The conversion ratio of Exploitation → Materialization guides where they place their bets. Beijing’s emphasis on economic espionage illustrates the point: stolen R&D, corporate blueprints, and proprietary intellectual property can be absorbed almost immediately because China’s legal framework and state–industry collaboration. Its vast industrial base is well positioned to materialize such exploitation gains into market-ready products at scale. Other nations might aspire to similar gains, but what practical advantage is there in exfiltrating aerospace schematics if domestic factories cannot field a fighter jet within half a century? Access alone is meaningless without a national engine: capital, legislation, supply chains, and skilled labor that can swiftly materialize gains into real economic or military power.

The United States applies the same conversion-logic but in a distinctly Western way. Washington’s cyber operators excel where exploitation feeds directly into precision intelligence and kinetic power. Surveillance implants inside adversary air-defense networks, for instance, can be piped into real-time targeting data for cruise-missile strikes or stealth-aircraft. The U.S. military can materialize such gains because it already fields the platforms, logistics, and doctrinal authority to act. Such joint operations seem well-rehearsed and highly effective.

By contrast, the United States would struggle to materialize value from industrial or commercial IP theft. Even if U.S. operators exfiltrated proprietary blueprints from a foreign aerospace firm, federal law and a largely privatized economy prevent simply handing that data to Boeing or Lockheed for rapid production. Strict export-control, intellectual-property, and antitrust regimes elongate or entirely collapse the exploitation <> materialization dynamic. In short, America wins most where cyber access can be fused with its existing intelligence-to-strike machinery, and wins least where conversion would require the state to commandeer private industry in ways its legal and economic system won’t easily permit.

4. Implications for Defense and Deterrence

Focus on High-Conversion Assets — Map which internal systems, if compromised, yield the fastest and most damaging real-world strategic gains to known adversaries. Allocate defenses accordingly.
Credible Retaliation — Signaling proportional, rapid response against attempted materialization raises the perceived cost and discourages exploitation of sensitive sectors.
Conversion-Chain Deterrence — By treating exploitation and materialization as inseparable, defenders should aim for disabling adversary capacity to convert access into effects. This could include disrupting critical supply-chain nodes, sanctioning key industrial inputs, etc.

5. A New Metric for Cyber Power

Counting botnets or zero-days no longer suffices. Decision-makers need a metric that captures conversion efficiency: expected strategic value delivered per exploitation operation. By quantifying the cost-to-benefit curve, chiefs of defense can direct scarce resources to the highest-risk conversion pathways and measure the real, not notional, reach of adversary cyber power.

Conclusion

Cyber conflict is ultimately about shaping the physical world. Exploitation gives an actor the keys; materialization drives the getaway car. Strategists who track only the break-in miss the decisive moment when access becomes statecraft. By integrating the two axes of Exploitation <> Materialization, as well as conversion costs, a strategist gains a sharper lens on adversary behavior and a clearer roadmap to resilient defense. Recognizing that states will go where they can materialize compels defenders to treat conversion chains as the true center of gravity. Disrupt those chains, and even the most prolific threat actors are stuck in the mud. Preserve them, and every foothold may one day translate into an impact headline. I believe that the future of cyber strategy hinges on which side better understands and manipulates the Exploitation <> Materialization equation.

Published on July 6, 2025.